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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the Judgment and Decree entered on May 29, 2008, by the

District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the state of Idaho, in and for the County
of Madison granting the Petition of the Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg
("Agency") for judicial confirmation of the validity of the Agency's proposed Revenue
Allocation ("Tax Increment") Bonds.

The Petition for Judicial Confirmation was

challenged by Appellant, Kenneth W. Hart, a concerned citizen of Rexburg, Idaho, on the
grounds that confirmation ofthe Petition would violate Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 and
Article XII, Section 4 of the Constitution o'f the state of Idaho. Appellant's statutory
argument that the mature date of the proposed revenue bonds violated the provisions of
Idaho Code§ 50-2904 will not be pursued further on appeal.

2.

Course of Proceedings Below.
On February 13, 2008, the Agency filed its Petition for Judicial Confirmation with

supporting documents. R. Vol. I, pp. 4-26. The Agency filed a memorandum in support
of its Petition for Judicial Confirmation on March 12, 2008. R. Vol. I, pp. 30-100. Hart
filed his Response in Opposition to the Agency's Petition and the Agency filed a Reply
which was followed by a hearing before the district court on March 31, 2008. Mr. Hart
appeared pro se in the proceedings before the district court.

The Agency in these

proceedings was represented by attorney Ryan P. Armbruster. The district court's docket
("Registry of Actions") is found at R. Vol. I, p. 2.

The district court filed its

Memorandum Decision on May 8, 2008, rejecting Mr. Hart's constitutional challenge and

granting the Agency's Petition. R. Vol. I, p. 129. On May 29, 2008, the court entered its .
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree in support of its decision.
R. Vol. I, p. 136. On June 18, 2008, Mr. Hart filed his Notice of Appeal and an identical
Amended Notice of Appeal, the latter of which changed one of the signatory attorneys
within the law firm representing Mr. Hart. R. Vol. I, pp. 148, 156.

3.

Statement of Facts.
The Urban Renewal Agency of the City of Rexburg is an urban renewal agency

created and existing under the authority of the Idaho Urban Renewal Law of 1965, Title
50, Chapter 20, Idaho Code. Asserting its alleged revenue allocation financing powers
under the Local Economic Development Act, Title 50, Chapter 29, Idaho Code, the
Agency filed its Petition seeking judicial confirmation of its power to enter into a bond
purchase agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance. The proceeds of the bonds were
intended for construction of a park in Rexburg. The agreement with Zions Bank was
conditioned on the Agency obtaining judicial confirmation of the validity of the bonds as
provided under Idaho Codes§§ 7-1304 et. seq.
The subject bonds, entitled "Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) Bonds Series
2008" are to be secured by the Agency's tax increment revenues received by property
taxes "allocated" to the Agency for this project by the city of Rexburg pursuant to the
Local Economic Development Act. This appeal does not challenge the procedural steps
taken by the city of Rexburg in establishing, amending and restating the urban renewal
plan, adopting Ordinance No. 950, serving the various notices, and adopting the various
resolutions recited at length in the Petition for Judicial Confirmation. R. Vol. I, pp. 5-10.

Rather, this appeal is limited to Mr. Hart's constitutional challenges under Article VIII,
Sections 3 and 4 and Article XII, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution as set forth below.
Relevant to the constitutional issues is the fact that on December 21, 2005, the
City Council of the city of Rexburg adopted Ordinance No. 950, which approved the
Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal Plan, North Highway Urban Renewal
Project, including South Addition ("Second Amended and Restated Urban Renewal
Plan") which contained revenue allocation financing provisions pursuant to Idaho Code §
50-2902 of the Local Economic Development Act. R. Vol. I, p. 7. Ordinance No. 950
became effective upon publication on December 23, 2005.

R. Vol. I, pp. 7-8.

On

December 4, 2007, the Agency adopted Resolution No. 2007-4 approving a bond
purchase agreement with Zions Bank Public Finance to fund the subject recreational
project.

Said Resolution authorized the issuance of the Revenue Allocation (Tax

Increment) Bonds Series 2008 which would be secured by the deposit of funds from the
proceeds of the revenue allocation by the City to the "Revenue Allocation Fund." The
revenue allocation proceeds deposited in the fund would be used for the following
purposes and in the following order of priority:
First, to pay the interest accruing on the Series 2008 Bonds and
any additional bonds by required deposits into the bond fund;
Second, to pay the principal of the Series 2008 Bonds and any
additional bonds payable within the next bond year by required
deposits into the bond fund;
Third, to fund the debt service reserve fund by required deposit
thereto, if any;
Fourth, to fund the administration fund;
Fifth, for any other lawful purpose of Petitioner. R. Vol. I, pp. 8-9.

On May 29, 2008, the court entered its Judgment and Decree granting the
Agency's Petition and concluding that the Agency was not required by the Constitution
of the state of Idaho to submit the issuance of its revenue notes or bonds to a vote of the
electorate and that the Agency is not the "alter ego" of the city of Rexburg. R. Vol. I, p.
145.

II.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Appellant raises these issues on appeal:
1. Whether the revenue allocation scheme pursuant to Chapter 29, Title

50, Idaho Code, the Local Economic Development Act violates the
provision of the Idaho Constitution prohibiting municipalities from:
(a) Incurring an indebtedness or liability exceeding income and
revenues for a specific year without the assent of a super
majority of qualified electors, as provided in the Idaho
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3;
(b) Lending or pledging credit, directly or indirectly, in any
manner to or in the aid of any association or corporation for
any amount or for any purpose whatsoever or become
responsible for any debt, contract or liability or any
association or corporation as set forth in Article VIII,
Section 4 and Article XII, Section 4 of the Idaho
Constitution.

2. Whether the Agency is an alter ego of the city of Rexburg and
therefore violates Article VIII, Section 3, Article VIII, Section 4 and
Article XII, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution.

III.
STANDARD OFREVIKW

On appeal, the Court defers to the factual findings of the district court unless
those findings are clearly erroneous. Bouten Const. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133
Idaho 756, 760, 992 P.2d 751, 755 (1999). The Appellate Court exercises free review of
the district courts application of the relevant law to the facts. City of Boise v. Frazier,
143 Idaho I, 2, 137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006); Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494,496, 975 P.2d
782, 784 (I 999). Constitutional issues are questions oflaw over which we also exercise
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho I, 2, 137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006); State v.

Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 314,316 (2004).

IV.
ARGUMENT
1.

Confirmation of Legal Issues on Appeal.

In finding No. 19 in the Judgment and Decree, the district court stated as follows:
The Response to Petition for Judicial Confirmation ("Response")
filed on or about March 24, 2008, by Mr. Kenneth Hart, a resident
of the city of Rexburg, raised three issues challenging the validity
of the purchase agreement and the Series 2008 Bonds as follows:
a. The Revenue Allocation Scheme violates the
provisions
of the Idaho
Constitution
prohibiting the city of Rexburg incurring

indebtedness or lending its credit without
confirmation by a super majority of the city's
citizens;
b. The Agency is the "alter ego" of the city of
Rexburg, therefore violating provision of the
Idaho Constitution prohibiting the city of
Rexburg from incurring indebtedness or
lending its credit without confirmation by a
super majority of the city's citizens; and,
c. The purchase agreement allows the Series 2008
Bonds to mature beyond the life of the Urban
Renewal Plan in violation ofI.C. § 50-2904.
As stated above, Appellant has abandoned the statutory claims set forth in "c"
above. The claim that the Revenue Allocation Scheme violates the Idaho Constitution
and that the Agency is the alter ego of the city of Rexburg, the Idaho Constitutional
provisions invoked thereby are Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 and Article XJI, Section 4.
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution generally bars municipalities
from incurring debts or liabilities without first conducting an election to secure voter
approval for the proposed expenditure.

This Section however contains the major

exception to the effect that no public vote is required if the expenditure is for an
"ordinary and necessary" expense authorized by the general laws of the state.

This

exception is referred to as the "proviso clause." City of Pocatello v. Peterson, 93 Idaho
774, 778, 473 P.2d 644, 648 (1970). There is no proviso issue in this case. The district
court below made no finding or conclusion regarding whether the subject Revenue
Allocation Bonds were, or were the financing for, ordinary and necessary expenses.
Moreover, on p. 45 of its Memorandum in Support of Judicial Confirmation, the Agency
expressly stated that· it was not seeking authorization for issuance of the bonds as
ordinary and necessary expenses:

In this case the Agency is not petitioning for judicial confirmation
based upon the "ordinary and necessary" clause of Article VIII,
Section 3. In fact, the "ordinary and necessary" clause is not
applicable to the Agency. R. Vol. I, p. 77.
Therefore, the Idaho constitutional provisions at issue are Article VIII, Section 3
requiring an election of the city's voters with no consideration given to the "proviso
clause" and Article VIII, Section 4 in conjunction with Article XII, Section 4, often
referred to as the "credit clauses" proscribing the loaning or pledging of public credit.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Campbell, 108 Idaho 950, 703 P.2d 714 (1985).

2.

The Revenue Allocation Scheme Provided Under Chapter 29, Title 50, Idaho

Code, The Local Development Act Is Unconstitutional Per Se, And As Applied In
This Case Under Article VIII, Section 3 Of The Idaho Constitution.

Appellant Hart alJeges that the district court erred in authorizing the Agency to
issue the subject Revenue Allocation Bonds for the reason that such issuance violates the
Idaho Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3, because no election was held to obtain
approval of the electorate for the purpose of approving said indebtedness or liability of
the city of Rexburg in funding - pledging its credit - to the Agency for issuance of the
bonds. Article VIII, Section 3 states in relevant part as follows:
No ..... city ..... shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any
manner, or for any purpose exceeding in that year, the income and
revenue provided for it for such year without the assent of twothirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to
be held for that purpose, nor unless, before or at the time of
incurring such indebtedness, provisions shall be made for the
collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such
indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund
for the payment of the principal thereof, within thirty (30) years
from the time of contracting the same. Any indebtedness or
liability incurred contrary to this provision shall be void: provided
that this Section shall not be construed to apply to the ordinary and
necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state .....

The constitutional history of Idaho clearly demonstrates that the framers intended
to severely limit the ability of local government to incur indebtedness. See, Proceeding
of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. 1, pp. 590-593. As stated in Feil v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, 648-649 (1912), the court noted that the framers

"employed more sweeping and prohibitive language in the framing of Section 3 of
Article VIII, and pronounce a more positive prohibition against excessive indebtedness,
than is to be found in any other constitution ..... " For sixty years, despite being the
subject of frequent litigation, Article VIII, Section 3 remains substantially unaltered with
its limitations being strictly applied by the Idaho Supreme Court. See, Dennis Colson,
Idaho's Constitution, pp. 105-110; 198-202 (1991).
Starting in 1950, Article VIII, Section 3 was amended to allow local govermnent
to issue revenue bonds for the construction of certain infrastructure, such as sewer
systems, treatment plants and off-street parking facilities.

Thereafter a number of

amendments have allowed local governments to issue revenue bonds for certain purposes,
where the bonds are repaid from rates and charges assessed against the users of .the
facilities as distinguished from taxes assessed against taxpayers. In more recent times
other amendments of Article VIJI have been promulgated, i.e. creating "independent
public bodies corporate and politic" (Article VIII, Section 1 amended in 1998). For
example, the vote requirement to approve revenue bonds for sewer systems in Article
VIII, Section 3 was lowered from two-thirds to a simple majolity. Nevertheless, none of
the six amendments of Article VIII, Section 3 to date have elected to amend this Section
at issue here.

It is in this context, then, it is submitted that the Court should analyze the

Agency's Petition to issue revenue allocation bonds specifically authorized under the
Local Economic Development Act LC. § 50-2001, et seq. The Idaho Supreme Court has
been frequently requested to revise its strict construction of Article VIII, Section 3 by
local government which advocated adoption of other states' interpretations.

To the

contrary, the Idaho Appellate Courts have made it clear that Idaho strictly construes this
provision and does not follow other jurisdictions' interpretations. Miller v. City of Buhl,
48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 843, 845 (1930); Feil, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, supra. Idaho has
resisted the "outcome oriented" philosophy of other jurisdictions and has strictly adhered
to the historical construction of this constitutional provision.

The Court in Boise

Development Co. v. City of Boise, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531, 535 (1914) stated in

commenting on a California court's outcome oriented philosophy:
[W]hen the court attempts by argument to escape the force and
effect of the constitutional provision under consideration and show
that the city incurred no liability under the contract, we submit that
its reasoning is not sound.
Consequently, the Idaho Supreme Court has limited its analysis of this
constitutional provision to considering and applying only Idaho cases. It is now settled
law in Idaho that voters must approve both general obligation bonds, which are secured
by full faith and credit of the issuer, and revenue bonds, which are secured solely by a
pledge of a special fund. Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 P.2d 839 (1983),
cert. denied, Chemical Bank v. Asson, 469 U.S. 870, (1984); Feil v. City of Coeur
d'Alene, supra; Boise v. Fra:::ier, supra. Despite other jurisdictions to the contrary, the

Idaho Supreme Court has uniformly rejected the "special fund" doctrine, which provides
that a municipality does not contract indebtedness or incur liability in violation of the

constitutional limitation by undertaking an obligation which is to be paid out of a special
fund consisting entirely of revenue or income from the property purchased or
constructed. Asson, supra I 05 Idaho at 438. In the present case the Agency's Revenue
Allocation Bonds will be funded solely out of a "special fund" from incremental tax
revenues derived from the appreciation in tax evaluation of the improvements financed
by the bond proceeds pursuant to the Local Economic Development Act, LC. § 50-2901
et. seq.
In its Memorandum in Support of its Petition, the Agency suggests that Revenue
Allocation Bonds do not fall within the constitutional terms of "indebtedness" or
"liability." R. Vol. I, pp. 67-69. In light of the amendment to Article VIII, Section 1,
urban renewal agencies are exempt from the operation of the vote requirements of Article
VIII, Section 3. This amendment ratified the finding of the Idaho Supreme Court in
Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 881-882, 499 P.2d 575

(1972).

Appellant's focus in this appeal is on the constitutional effect which the

application of the provisions of the Local Economic Development Act in conjunction
with the Urban Renewal Law has on the municipalities with respect to their use and
pledge of ad valorem tax generated funds to raise money to finance the subject projects
without voter approval. Indeed, if the municipalities are constitutionally prohibited from
participating in "revenue allocation financing" then the scheme falls apart.
The Agency claims the municipalities can engage in this use and pledge of tax
generated revenues for tax increment financing of urban renewal projects. The argument
is that since the incremental tax revenues that fund the bonds are attributable to increases
in the assessed value of the taxable property in the revenue allocation area, it is somehow

no longer a debt or liability of the municipality. In other words, the argument goes that
since the original base value of the property is not encumbered, the city has suffered no
indebtedness or liability. This is sleight of hand in the extreme. The mere fact that the
property is tied up for the bond period is cost to the municipality. The generation of a
cost automatically creates a debt or liability. Moreover, Article VIII, Section 3 of the
Idaho Constitution not only prohibits incurring of such indebtedness, it prohibits
incurring such liability in anv manner or for any pumose.

"Liability'' has been

interpreted by the Idaho Courts to be much more sweeping and comprehensive than the
term "indebtedness."

Feil, supra 23 Idaho at 50, 129 P. at 649; see also, Boise

Development Co., supra 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531; Straughan v. City of Coeur d'Alene,

53 Idaho 494, 24 P.2d 321 (1932). The Court noted in Feil that the Idaho Constitution
"not only prohibits incurring anv indebtedness, but it also prohibits incurring anv liability
in any manner or for any purpose, exceeding the yearly income and revenue. Feil, supra
23 Idaho at 50, 129 P. at 649 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Feil Court recognized
that local governments were precluded from trying to circumvent the constitutional
limitations. In that regard, the Court stated:
The framers of our Constitution were not content to say that no city
shall incur any indebtedness "in any manner or for any purpose,"
but they rather preferred to say that no city shall incur any
indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose. It must
be clear to the ordinary mind, on reading this language that the
framers of the Constitution meant to cover all kinds and character
of debts and obligations for which a city may become bound, and
to preclude circuitous and evasive methods of incurring debts and
obligations to be met by the city or its inhabitants. Id.
After stressing that the framers of the Idaho Constitution intended the term
"liability" to be more expansive than the tenn "debt", the Court in Feil included in the

definition ofliability "the state of being bound or obligated in law or justice to do, pay, or
make good something; legal responsibility .... " Id. Hence, the legal responsibilities of the
entities engaged in an urban renewal plan and project involving revenue allocation
financing results in said parties incurring respective liabilities.

Further, despite all

applicable attempts to distinguish incremental revenues in this instance, they are still
proceeds from property taxes and therefore cannot be removed from the category of
obligations which must be approved by the voters under the provisions of Article VIII,
Section 3. Other jurisdictions have sided with Idaho on this issue. In State ex. rel.
Washington State Finance Committee v. Martin, 384 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1963) the court
held:

If the revenues in it derive exclusively from the operation of the
device or organ of government financed by the fund, as in the case
of a toll bridge, or the operation of the State Liquor Control Board,
or from sales or leases of publicly owned lands, any securities
issued solely upon the credit of the fund are not debts of the state,
but debts of the fund only. But if the state nndertakes or agrees to
provide any part of the fund from any general tax, be it excise or
ad valorem, then securities issued upon the credit of the fund are
likewise issued upon the credit of tlie state and are in truth debts of
the state. Id. at 842.
Finally, the agency seeks to avoid the application of Article VIII, Section 3 to
prohibit revenue allocation financing by asserting it is not one of the governmental
entities enumerated in that constitutional provision. That argument is inapposite. There
are two responses to this assertion. First, the issuance of revenue allocation bonds is a
two way street involving in this instance both the agency and the city of Rexburg. The
city of Rexburg is without a doubt an entity within the meaning of Article VIII, Section 3.
As such, Rexburg cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Hence, it cannot incur
and indebtedness or liability in anv manner, which under the Local Economic

Development Act would result in such a debt or liability. Under Article XII, Section 4, a
municipality cannot loan its credit "or raise money for" any "corporation or association
whatever." Clearly under the scheme of the Local Economic Development Act, the
generation of the revenue bonds is derived directly from the city's pledge of its credit and
the raising of money for the bonds. As stated in paragraph 19 of the Findings of Fact, the
district court's Judgment and Decree, "Rexburg will collect the property taxes that will
pay off the bonds." R. Vol. I, p. 144. Jhey began directing and financing the entire
projects but "indirectly" through statutory and regulatory artifice. Therefore, from the
standpoint of the city's participation alone, the mechanism of providing for the revenue
allocation bonds violates the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4 of the Idaho
Constitution.
The Agency notes that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the urban renewal
agencies are not one of the governmental entities enumerated in Article VIII, Section 3 of
the Idaho Constitution. See, Boise Redevelopment Association v. Yick Kong Corp., supra.
At the time of the Yick Kong decision, the current Local Economic Development Act
providing for revenue allocation bonds did not exist. The Act was promulgated in 1988
for the purpose of encouraging private development in blighted areas of Idaho
communities.

LC. § 50-2901 (purpose).

See, Statement of Purpose H.B. 497, 49 th

Legislature, 2d. Reg. Sess. (Idaho, 1988). As a result municipalities became much more
directly involved in the Urban Renewal process, in fact, this intimate involvement of the
city in the process is a far, far cry from the federally funded project in Yick Kong. At the
time of the Yick Kong decision, the source of funding for urban renewal agencies was
largely derived from federal grants. With the advent of revenue allocation bonds under

the Local Economic Development Act, the funding source shifted to municipalities
within the state of Idaho, thereby adding another Idaho entity into the constitutional
equation regarding issues of liability, debt and credit. Idaho cases have repeatedly held
that it is improper to attempt to evade or circumvent the force and effect of Article VIII,
Section 3 or to attempt to do what it cannot do directly. See, 0 'Bryant v. City of Idaho
Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 325-326, 303 P.2d 672, 674 (1956).

In O'Bryant, the Court

denounced efforts to evade constitutional limitations, quoting a Colorado case which
held:
Contrary to popular opinion, mere schemes to evade law, once
their true character is established are impotent for the purpose
intended. Courts sweep them aside as so much rubbish. 0 'Bryant,
78 Idaho at 325, 303 P.2d at 678.
In Dunbar v. Board of Com 'rs of Canyon County, 5 Idaho 407, 414, 49 P. 409,
411 (1897), the Court uttered the following caveat:

If boards of county commissioners are permitted to violate,
disregard, and set at naught one plain provision of the constitution,
then they may violate any and all provisions of that instmment, and
the people who pay the taxes and .bear the burdens of government
are without protection, and at the mercy and whims of county
commissioners.
The Idaho Supreme Court has manifested a long and consistent history of
thwarting attempts by local governments to circumvent the provisions of Article VIII,
Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. The Constitution clearly requires that before and
indebtedness or liability is incurred by any municipality which exceeds the income and
revenue provided for it in the current year, it must be submitted to a vote of the people
and be authorized by two-thirds of the qualified electors.

If this requirement were

followed, the scheme to generate revenue allocation bonds under the Local Economic
Development Act would not get off the ground.
3.

The Revenue Allocation Scheme Under The Economic Development Act

Violates Article VIII, Section 4 And Article XII, Section 4 Of The Idaho State
Constitution Prohibiting Municipalities From Loaning Or Pledging Their Credit,
Or The Faith Thereof, Or Raising Money, Directly Or Indirectly, In Any Manner,
To Or For Any Corporation Or Association 'Whatever.
Article VIII, Section 4 and Article XII, Section 4 are the "credit clauses" under
the Idaho Constitution and prohibit governmental entities from loaning or pledging their
credit for the benefit of any corporation for any amount or for any purpose whatsoever.
Article VIII, Section 4 provides:
No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school
district, or other subdivision, shall lend, or pledge the credit or
faith thereof directly or indirectly, in any manner, to, or in aid of
any individual, association, or corporation, for any amount or for
any purpose whatever, or become responsible for any debt,
contract or liability of any individual, association or corporation in
or out of this state.
Article XII, Section 4 provides:
No county, town, city, or other municipal corporation by vote of its
citizens or otherwise, shall ever become a stockholder in any joint
stock company, corporation or association whatever, or raise
money for, or make donation or loan of its credit to, or in the aid of
any such company or association ...
The issue of whether the municipality was unconstitutionally lending or pledging
its credit was address in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., Supra. In that
case the Court held that those sections relating to "association", "corporation", etc. were
intended to refer only to "private interests."

Id. Idaho at 884, P.2d at 583.

This

conclusion was based on the Court's finding in Engelking v. Investment Board, 93 Idaho
217, 458 P.2d 213 (1969), where the historical purpose of the constitutional prohibitions
was explained as preventing favorite status from being given to any private enterprise or
individual in the application of public funds. It was feared that private interests would
gain advantages at the expense of the taxpayers. Even though the Court noted that it was
"at least arguable that the above provisions do indeed constitute a "donation or loan of
credit" and that the City of Boise is "raising money for" the plaintiff," the Court held that
the urban renewal agency was not a private entity of the sort intended by the subject
constitutional provision.
However, the advent of the Local Economic Development Act in 1988 allowing
for the use of revenue allocation financing brings private interests back into the picture.
The very purpose of the Local Economic Development Act is to utilize the agency as a
development conduit with the objective being to turn the development property over to
private interests. (See, Legislative history - statement of purpose of act, supra). The
purpose of the Act is stated in pertinent part "to encourage taxing district to cooperate in
the allocation of future tax revenues arising in urban areas .... In order to facilitate long
term growth of their common tax base, and to encourage private investment within urban
areas .... " l.C. § 50-2901. Hence, the lending and pledging of credit and the raising of
money is "indirectly" to the benefit of private corporations, associations and interest, with
the agency being the conduit. The Local Economic Development Act and the use of
revenue allocation financing did not exist when Yick Kong was decided in 1972. Now
with revenue allocation of the municipal tax base to the purpose of revenue bonds for the
ultimate purpose of private development, the entire factual matrix has significantly

changed. For that reason alone, Yick Kong is no longer applicable with reference to the
purpose and the mechanism of revenue allocation financing. The fact that the urban
renewal agency under Yick Kong had no ability to impose taxes on the residence of the
city of Boise nor encumber any public assets to the advantage of private enterprise is
inapposite in the situation of the revenue allocation financing mechanism, where the
assets of the municipality are encumbered and pledged for an extended period to raise
money for the agency to eventually attract and benefit private interests and where the
municipality forms the Agency and designates the projects.
The attempt to relegate the older case and previous strictness in the application of
the provisions of Article VIII and Article XII to the dustbin of history on the grounds that
the founders feared large private interests fails because concerns regarding large private
interest abuse still exists. The Wal-Mart or Microsoft of today can be as imposing and
grasping at tax benefits as was the railroad of yesterday. The fundamental fact situation
has changed from Yick Kong with the advent of the Local Economic Development Act
rendering it inapplicable. To say that the development under urban renewal pays for
itself whereas the railroads of old were subsidized is not a fair comparison. Today, the
private enterprises that follow urban renewal take advantage of a subsidized situation the
same as the railroads of old took advantage of the right of way grants and created far
more development than their land grants were worth - whole cities sprang up along the
railroad routes. In both cases the public subsidy helped bring about development. And in
both cases the constitutional restrictions of A1iicle VIII, Section 3 and Article XII,
Section 4 should apply.

A city cannot pledge revenues "from any source" whatever

without creating an "indebtedness" within the constitutional provision limiting

indebtedness.

Williams v. City of Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931).

As

discussed above, the concept of "liability" is even broader than that of indebtedness in
Idaho and is relevant to Mr. Hart's claim that, especially now with the advent ofrevenue
allocation financing, the constitutional requirement that, before an indebtedness or
liability is incurred which exceeds the income and revenue provided for it in the current
year, it must be submitted to a vote of the people and be authorized by two-thirds of the
qualified_ electors.
4.

The Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency is an alter ego of the city of Rexburg.

In Yick Kong, the Court concluded that the statutory provisions allowing a
municipality to be involved in a creation of an urban renewal agency and providing for
close association between the two entities did not make the agency the alter ego of the
city of Boise. Yick Kong, Idaho at 882, P .2d at 581. The Court found the following
elements to be significant in determining that the agency was not an alter ego of the city.
We note, however, that plaintiff is an entity of legislative creation
and it is the legislah1re that establishes powers, duties and
authorities. The legislature in what we may assume to be an effort
to maintain some local voice in the question of whether a particular
municipality had a need for urban renewal, required a finding of
need by a municipality prior to the time that an urban renewal
agency could come into existence. While the particular city may
trigger the existence of the plaintiff, it cannot control its powers or
operations. Again, while the legislature may have sought to allow
a local voice in the selection of the commissioners of the plaintiff,
there is no attack upon the integrity or independence of the
commissioners of the plaintiff and we cannot say that such
appointment procedures cause inherent control in the city. Neither
does the provision for removal of commissioner necessary show
any control by the city. The removal procedures are not arbitrary,
nor are they solely in the discretion of the city. Removal can result
only after a hearing in consistent with the exact standard set forth
in LC. § 50-1006(d). Yick Kong, Idaho at 881-882, P.2d at 580581.

The underlying fact situation upon which the Court based its opm10n has
substantially changed with the advent of revenue allocation financing, as discussed
above. ·whereas the urban renewal projects were formerly for most part financed by
federal funds, they are now funded primarily by local entities. This change in source of
financing must be given great weight. As a result of the Local Economic Development
Act, the municipalities now provide tax based funding through the agencies for the
projects which the municipalities wish to develop. Further, the independence of the
urban renewal boards has been severely eroded.

Under the 1986 statute no elected

officials were to be on the board. Under current law, LC. § 50-2006, membership of the
agencies may include members of the city councils, and the amount and source of tax
revenues is calculated by the county treasurer and paid directly to the urban renewal
agency by the county auditor. Under these circumstances, the creation, organization,
appointments, designation of projects, and funding are totally controlled by the
municipality. As a result, by using revenue allocation financing, the municipalities have
been able to successfully create a real "alter ego" and circumvent the constitutional
provisions of Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 and Article XII, Section 4.

Mr. Hart

respectfully submits that this circumvention violates those constitutional provisions.

V.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of the Urban Renewal Law in allowing more direct control and
involvement of municipalities in that process in conjunction with the development of tax
revenue allocation financing under the Local Economic Development Act has gradually,

by unnoticed inches, resulted in a statutory scheme to circumvent the force and effect of
Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 and Article XII, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution. The
combined statutory scheme allows municipalities to indirectly do what they cannot do
directly. If not as a "facial" violation, then, in this case, at least as "an applied" violation,
the city of Rexburg has created its own "exempt" alter ego, which it created, appointed
directors, selected the projects, pledged and allocated ad valorem tax revenues to finance
the project to attract private investors. When we see through the "Emperor's clothes" in
this case, the naked truth is that the city of Rexburg designed, controlled and funded the
entire proposed project with the people's money without getting the approval of the
voters as required by the Constitution of the state of Idaho.

Whether the purpose is to

attract a railroad or a Wal-Mart, the process has gone too far. The statement of the Court
in Feil is as apropos today as then:
The framers of our Constitution were not content to say that no city
shall incur any indebtedness "in any manner or for any purpose,"
but they rather preferred to say that no city shall incur any
indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose. It must
be clear to the ordinary mind, on reading this language, that the
framers of the Constitution meant to cover all kinds and character
of debts and obligations for which a city may become bound, and
to preclude circuitous and evasive methods of incurring debts and
obligations to be met by the city or its inhabitants. Feil, 23 Idaho
at 50, 129 P. at 649 (emphasis added).
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